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ARTICLES
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
EXCLUSIONS UNDER UCITA
by DOUGLAS E. PHILLIPSt
ABSTRACT
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")
elicits both love and hate, but decision time is here. Two states have
enacted UCITA, several others are considering it, and UCITA choice-oflaw clauses are already beginning to appear in software license agreements and other computer information contracts. This article focuses on
how UCITA affects a pivotal issue: enforceability of contract clauses that
exclude consequential damages. Losses from software development gone
awry often far exceed the customer's investment and the developer's return. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, questions remain about the
enforceability in certain circumstances of consequential damages exclusions. UCITA answers these questions by providing that such exclusions
survive the failure of essential purpose of a limited remedy, so long as
the agreement expressly provides that the exclusion is independent of
the agreed remedy. Does UCITA's answer honor or depart from U.S.
commercial law's longstanding focus on the parties' "bargain in fact"?
Only a close comparison of UCITA with existing law can reveal its true
philosophical and practical effects.
INTRODUCTION
Views about UCITA diametrically diverge. 1 Nevertheless, state legt © 2001 Douglas E. Phillips. The author is a lawyer for Covington & Burling, a law
firm with offices in Washington, D.C., New York, San Francisco, Brussels, and London. He
represents licensors and licensees in computer information transactions. The views expressed here are solely his own.
1. Compare UCITA Prefatory Note (stating that "UCITA is a statute for our time"),
with Cem Kaner, Symposium: Uniform Computer Information TransactionAct: Software
Engineeringand UCITA, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 435, 546 (1999) (stating
that "UCITA is pushing us down the wrong path").
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islatures in which UCITA is now pending, and lawyers who assist clients
in computer information transactions, must place their bets. Versions of
UCITA have been enacted in Maryland and Virginia, 2 and other states
are considering enactment. 3 In negotiating software licenses and other
computer information transactions, lawyers are being confronted with
proposed contractual choice-of-law clauses that invoke UCITA. Moreover, UCITA contains provisions that enable parties not only to opt in, but
also-with some restrictions-to opt out. 4 UCITA's effects will project
far into the future. For all these reasons, judgments about UCITA need
to be made now.
UCITA's scope is broad, and its effects must be gauged against the
rules and principles that otherwise apply. As a result, useful judgments
about UCITA are most likely to emerge not from blanket characterizations, but from a collection of assessments focused on particular issues.
In an effort to offer one such assessment, this article addresses how
UCITA is likely to affect one of the most pivotal issues in large or custom
computer-information transactions. That issue is whether a contractual
limitation or exclusion of consequential damages will be upheld even if
the licensee or other customer is able to show that circumstances have
caused the agreement's limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose. 5
UCITA's treatment of this question is either highly customerfriendly or highly pro-vendor, depending on which commentator one con2. Md. Commercial Law Code Ann. § 22-101 et seq. (1999); Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1501.1 et seq. (2000) (enacted in Mar. 2000 with an effective date of July 1, 2000).
3. Ariz. H. 2041, 454h Leg., 1" Sess. (Jan. 8, 2001); Ill. H. 3058 9 2nd Gen. Assembly,
2001-2002 Gen. Assembly (Feb. 27, 2001); Me. H. 987, 120' Leg., I" Sess. (Mar. 5, 2001);
N.J. H. 3560, 209"' Leg., 2" Sess. (May 17, 2001); N.D. H. 2429, 57' Leg. (Jan. 29, 2001);
Tx. H. 1785, 77' Leg. (Feb. 16, 2001).
4. UCITA § 104. Subject to specified rules,
[t]he parties may agree that [UCITA], including contract-formation rules, governs
the transaction, in whole or part, or that other law governs the transaction and
[UCITA] does not apply, if a material part of the subject matter to which the
agreement applies is computer information or informational rights in it that are
within the scope of [UCITA], or is subject matter within [UCITA under Section
103(b), or is subject matter excluded by Section 103(d)(1) or (2).

Id.
5. The failure of essential purpose doctrine, which this article discusses, is not the
only legal basis on which a contractual exclusion of consequential damages can be overcome. For example, fraud in the inducement may defeat such a contractual clause. VMark
Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that "a
party may not escape liability for misrepresentation by resort[ing] to such provisions" as
"damage limitation ... clauses of [an] agreement," because "even sophisticated businessmen must deal with each other honestly and may not induce contractual relations by material misrepresentations"). Failure of essential purpose is important, however, because it
provides a basis to avoid consequential damages exclusions without showing fraud, which
typically must be pleaded with particularity and supported by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
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sults. 6 For example, one observer concluded that UCITA Section 803,
which deals with failure of essential purpose, provides "a significant protection for all licensees, including consumer and mass-market licensees"
as well as business licensees. 7 Another, however, maintained that
"UCITA fixes [the failure of essential purpose] problem (for sellers) . . . ."8 As the polarity of these remarks suggests, determining
UCITA's effect on consequential damages exclusions requires a closer
look. Inevitably, the investigation leads to a review of the failure of essential purpose under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), the varying judicial solutions to the interpretative conundrum that the UCC's
language on this key issue has spawned, and the concept of bargain in
fact that underlies UCC Article 2.
DISCUSSION
FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE UNDER THE UCC

In software licenses and other computer information transactions,
as in contracts for traditional sale of goods, "consequential damages exclusions are hands down the most significant limitation of liability .... 9
Potential liability for consequential damages can be "enormous." 10 Indeed, as businesses of all kinds increasingly rely on software for essential functions, software failure can cause devastating consequential
loss.1 1 For example, in one case, a software customer sought to recover
$21 million paid for software that allegedly failed to perform as warranted, and also sought to recover an additional $30 million allegedly
6. Compare Holly K. Towle, Symposium on Approaching E-Commerce Through Uniform Legislation: Understandingthe Uniform Computer Information TransactionsAct and
the Uniform Electronic TransactionsAct: Mass Market Transactionsin the Uniform Computer Information TransactionsAct, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 371, 455 (2000), with Kaner, supra n.
1, at 546.
7. Towle, supra n. 6, at 455.
8. Kaner, supra n. 1, at 491. Jean Braucher, Uniform Computer Information TransactionsAct (UCITA): Objections from the Consumer Perspective, 5 Cyberspace Law. 2 (Sept.
2000) (stating that UCITA "[elliminates the key benefit of the Article 2 doctrine of failure of
essential purpose of a limited remedy" because UCITA "[elxpressly permits boilerplate to
preserve exclusion of incidental and consequential damages even when an agreed exclusive
remedy fails or is unconscionable."); contra James C. McKay, Jr., UCITA and the Consumer:A Response to Professor Braucher,5 Cyberspace Law. 9 (Nov. 2000). "[Tlhere is no
'key' benefit of Article 2 that is disturbed by UCITA. UCITA does benefit consumers, however." Id.
9. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 107 N.J. 584, 592 (N.J. 1987)
(quoting Roy R. Anderson, Failureof EssentialPurposeand EssentialFailureon Purpose:A
Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 S.W.L.J. 759, 774 (1977)).
10. Id.
11. Douglas E. Phillips, When Software Fails:Emerging Standardsof Vendor Liability
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 Bus. Law. 151, 152-54 (1994).
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lost as an indirect result of the breach. 12 On another occasion, software
that cost only $204,000 allegedly caused the user to incur consequential
13
damages of $2.8 million.
Because consequential damages can far exceed the price a software
company receives for its product, vendors commonly seek to limit or exclude consequential damages. 14 In recent years, as software transactions have become increasingly prevalent, an increasing variety of
contractual arrangements has emerged. 15 Consequential damages are
sometimes allowed, at least up to certain limits. 1 6 Nevertheless, vendors

often insist on contractual protection against them. 17 The value of a contractual limitation or exclusion of such damages, however, depends on
1
the likelihood that if the exclusion is challenged, a court will enforce it. 8
This likelihood, in turn, often depends on the choice of applicable law.
The future, and perhaps the very survival, of contracting parties may
ride on the result.
Substantial pre-UCITA authority applies Article 2 of the UCC to
software transactions. 19 UCC Section 2-719(2) provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in [the UCC]." 2 0 The UCC permits
21
the buyer to recover consequential damages in appropriate cases. UCC
Section 2-719(3), however, provides: "[clonsequential damages may be
limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconsciona-

12. ColonialLife Ins. Co. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 237 (D.N.H. 1993).
13. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Intl., Inc, 600 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213, 218
(App. Div. 1993), affd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1994).
14. Phillips, supra n. 11, at 154. "The far-reaching effects of software failure may expose software vendors to equally far-reaching liability. Vendors, ranging from fragile startup companies to substantial enterprises, recognize that the costs of one failed project can
consume the profits from scores of successes." Id.
15. See generally id.
16. Id. at 175.
17. Id. at 154-55. See e.g. Commun. Groups, Inc. v. Warner Commun., Inc., 527
N.Y.S.2d 341, 346 (1988).
18. Id.
19. See e.g. Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991); RRX
Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1985); NMP Corp. v.Parametric
Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla. 1997); Colonial Life Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp.
at 239. Although Article 2 is labeled "sales," it applies to "transactions in goods," including
"specially manufactured goods." U.C.C. § 2-102. This language has provided a basis for
applying Article 2 to transactions in software even when they are characterized as licenses
and even when the software is specially developed.
20. U.C.C. § 2-719(2). "Professors White and Summers observe that 2-719(2) has been
the most powerful tool in the U.C.C. arsenal for dissatisfied customers." Michael L. Rustad, Symposium: Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act: Making UCITA More
Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 547, 583 (1999) (quoting James
J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 449 (5th ed., 1999)).
21. U.C.C. § 2-715(2).

20011

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

ble." 2 2 If a vendor has given a limited repair warranty, but cannot or

does not correct software flaws, the limited repair warranty may fail of
its essential purpose. 23 Are consequential damages therefore
recoverable?
Courts have split over how subsections 2 and 3 of UCC Section 2-719
interact.2 4 One approach is to conclude that if an exclusive or limited
remedy fails of its essential purpose, then Section 2-719(2) authorizes all
UCC remedies, including consequential damages, without regard to
whether a separate limitation of exclusion of consequential damages is
unconscionable under Section 2-719(3).25 This view is often characterized as holding that the two subsections are "interdependent."26 A second approach, under which a consequential damages exclusion is less
27
vulnerable, is to conclude that the two subsections are "independent."
This approach maintains that even if a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose under Section 2-719(2), a consequential damages exclusion
survives failure of essential purpose under Section 2-719(3) unless it is
unconscionable and, under Section 2-719(3) when the loss is commercial,
28
such exclusions presumptively are not unconscionable.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed out in 1995, "[tlhe effect of
the failure of a limited remedy to meet its essential purpose presents a
most vexing problem that has plagued courts ever since the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code." 29 Substantial pre-UCITA authority exists on both sides of the question and in the middle as well. 30 This au-

thority is important in assessing whether the consequential damages
exclusion is likely to be upheld under the law that governs a transaction.
Under current law, if the applicable law is that of a jurisdiction that
adopts (1) the interdependent view in which the failure of essential purpose of a limited remedy automatically defeats a separate consequential
damages exclusion or (2) an intermediate position short of the independent view, the vendor-despite its best drafting efforts-may find itself
1
facing a very substantial consequential damages exposure. 3
22. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
23. See Phillips, supra n. 11, at 176.
24. See Colonial Life Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. at 240.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Intl. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 534 N.W.2d 261, 267 (Minn. 1995).
30. See id.; see also infra nn. 40-100 and text accompanying.
31. Intl. Fin. Servs., Inc., 534 N.W.2d at 267. Conversely, although a customer ordinarily should not rely at the contract drafting stage on the possibility that an agreed term will
be unenforceable, the customer generally is better off under the law of a state that may not
enforce provisions restricting the customer's damages. Even if the matter is not fully liti-
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The UCITA Approach
UCITA Section 803(b) parallels UCC Section 2-719(2) in adopting
the failure of essential purpose doctrine3 2 UCITA Section 803(d) parallels UCC Section 2-719(3) in permitting exclusions of consequential damages unless they are unconscionable. 3 3 Unlike UCC Article 2, however,
UCITA also includes, in Section 803(c), the following provision: "Failure
or unconscionability of an agreed exclusive or limited remedy makes a
term disclaiming or limiting consequential or incidental damages unenforceable unless the agreement expressly makes the disclaimer or limita34
tion independent of the agreed remedy."
The key word here is "unless." Presumably, to make the consequential damages exclusion enforceable under the UCITA standard despite an
agreed remedy's failure of essential purpose, the agreement simply
needs to recite, as indicated by the "unless" clause, that the consequential damages exclusion is independent of the agreed remedy.3 5 The
UCITA Official Comment states: "If the agreement expressly states that
the terms are independent, there is no reason in principle to preclude
enforcement of that agreement." 36 Although there may be questions
about how courts will construe this new law, UCITA was clearly in37
tended to resolve this issue.
On its face, then, UCITA offers a recipe for drafting a consequential
damages exclusion that is likely to be given effect despite a limited remedy's failure of essential purpose. Only if a vendor neglects to follow the
recipe or is forced in a negotiation to depart from it, does the vendor face
a serious risk that such protection will be denied. Does this result make
the vendor better off and the customer worse off than under current law?
The answer, of course, depends on current law.
Comparing UCITA to Current Law
The vendor advantage under UCITA-and the corresponding customer disadvantage-are likely to be greatest when the alternative is to
apply state law under which a limited remedy's failure of essential purpose defeats a consequential damages exclusion. Despite the longstanding nature of the debate over this issue under UCC Article 2, state law
gated, the customer may have somewhat greater leverage in the event of software
problems.
32. Compare UCITA § 803(b) with U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
33. Compare UCITA § 803(d) with U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
34. UCITA § 803(c).
35. Id. § 803, Off. Cmt. 5.
36. Id.
37. "Subsections (b) and (c) [of Section 803] follow Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code . . but clarify an issue litigated under Article 2." Id.
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38
remains firmly divided.

The "Interdependent"View
Decisions under the laws of several states appear to indicate that a
consequential damages exclusion automatically disappears when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose. These states include Arkan42
Missouri, 4 3 Nebraska,44 Ohio, 45
sas,3 9 Hawaii, 40 Idaho, 4 1 Michigan,
46
47
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and possibly other states. 48 Although a number of the controlling decisions involve consumer purchases, the failure
of essential purpose doctrine under the UCC does not distinguish between consumers and commercial customers. Thus, under decisions that
construe the laws of any of these states, a consequential damages exclusion is potentially vulnerable to a contention that a limited remedy has
failed of its essential purpose. In contrast, UCITA appears to offer a decided advantage to vendors.
The interdependent view is often based on what its proponents consider to be a literal reading of UCC Section 2-719. As the Eighth Circuit
remarked in a 1982 decision, "[a] finding of unconscionability is, as a
matter of logic, simply unnecessary in cases where section 2-719(2) applies." 49 If, under Section 2-719(2), the failure of essential purpose
means that "remedy may be had as provided in" the UCC, this reasoning
38. See infra nn. 40-100 and accompanying text.
39. Great Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc., 785 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Ark.
1990); CaterpillarTractor Co. v. Waterson, 679 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984).
40. Earl M. Jorgenson Co. v. Mark Constr. Co., 540 P.2d 978, 988 (Haw. 1975).
41. Clark v. Intl. Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 797-98 (Idaho 1978).
42. Kelynack v. Yahama Motor Corp., 394 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); King v.
Taylor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 436
Mich. 876 (1990).
43. Givan v. Mack Truck, 569 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); R.W. Murray Co. v.
ShatterproofGlass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 272 (8th Cir. 1985).
44. John Deere Co. v. Hand, 319 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Neb. 1982).
45. Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 396 N.E.2d 761, 765 (Ohio 1979); Arias/Root
Eng'g, Inc. v. CincinnatiMilacron Mktg. Co., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22630, *19 (9th Cir.
Sept. 25, 1991).
46. Collins Radio Co. v. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039, 1051 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
47. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513, 526 (Wis. 1978); Ragen Corp. v.
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619, 625 (3d Cir. 1990).
48. There is apparent support for the interdependent view under the law of Alabama
and Florida as well. See Typographical Serv., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 721 F.2d 1317, 1320 (11th
Cir. 1983) (Fla. law); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Harrell,431 So.2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1983).
Finally, as discussed in the text accompanying nn. 94-100 infra, there is mixed authority
under Pennsylvania law.
49. Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693 F.2d 770, 774 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying South Dakota
law); see also Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 161 (S.D. 1975). This reasoning, however, has been questioned by the South Dakota Supreme Court. See Johnson v.
John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 237-38 (S.D. 1981).

302

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIX

goes, then a clause that purports to limit remedies that otherwise "may
be had" under the UCC-such as consequential damages-can no longer
be given effect. 50 Section 2-719(3), however, is also part of the UCC, in
which it is "provided" that consequential damages may not "be had" if
the agreement contains an exclusion of such damages and the exclusion
is not unconscionable. 5 1 Perhaps because of the resulting interpretive
quandary, the interdependent view is far from universal.
Mixed Approaches
Decisions under the laws of a second set of jurisdictions-including
the commercially important states of California, 5 2 Illinois, 53 New
Jersey, 54 and Washington, 55 as well as Colorado, 5 6 Connecticut, 5 7 Indiana, 58 and, before UCITA, Maryland 59 -are more difficult to classify.
These decisions, which tend to seek middle ground, try to avoid problems
with the language of UCC Section 2-719 by departing from, or supplementing, the language. In so doing, they adopt standards that do not
necessarily lend themselves to uniform application, and as a result, they
do not provide clear-cut assurance that a consequential damages exclusion will be enforced. Thus, UCITA offers the vendor a potential advantage over pre-UCITA law in these states as well.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has issued decisions under both California and Washington law that require a case-by-case factual analysis.
In Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp.,60 the court relied on a prediction that "Washington courts would take a case-by-case approach and
examine the contract provisions to determine whether the exclusive remedy and damage exclusions are either 'separable elements of risk alloca61
tion' or 'inseparable parts of a unitary package of risk-allocation.'
50. Hartzell, 693 F.2d at 774.
51. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
52. RRX Indus., 772 F.2d at 547; see e.g. Cal. State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823, *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1996).
53. Sunny Indus. v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7001, *38 (7th Cir.
Apr. 12, 1999) (summarizing extensive Illinois authority); see V-M Corp. v. BernardDistrib.
Co., 447 F. 2d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1971).
54. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 107 N.J. at 599-600; see ChatlosSys., Inc. v. Natl. Cash
Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980).
55. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp., 902 F.2d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 1990).
56. Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1991).
57. McKernan v. United Technologies Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60, 71 (D. Conn. 1989).
58. Mid Continent Cabinetry, Inc. v.George Koch Sons, Inc., No. 87-1248-C, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10644, *40 (D. Kan. July 11, 1991).
59. Dowty Commun., Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 581, 585 (D.
Md. 1992), affd sub nom. Cray Commun., Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390,
396 (4th Cir. 1994).
60. 902 F.2d 703.
61. Id. at 708.
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This standard, however, arguably just recasts the question, leaving it to
a court's essentially ad hoc judgment to decide whether the exclusive
remedy and damage exclusion should fall together. In Milgard,the court
held the consequential damages exclusion invalid after extensive failed
repair efforts by the seller, observing that the buyer "did not agree to pay
$1.45 million in order to participate in a science experiment."6 2 One may
wonder how many buyers do.
The Milgard court's ultimate emphasis on the extent of the buyer's
loss, rather than the structure of the "package of risk-allocation," is reminiscent of an earlier decision under California law in which the Ninth
Circuit held in a computer contract case that a consequential damages
limitation was "expunged" by the limited remedy's failure of essential
purpose where the seller's default under the limited remedy of repair
was "total and fundamental."6 3 At least one pre-UCITA Maryland decision seems to follow this standard. 6 4 Under such a standard, the facts of
the transaction may determine whether the breach is sufficiently "fundamental" to overcome the exclusion.65
New Jersey law also leaves the door open to consideration of particular circumstances. 66 In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register
Corp.,67 a 1980 computer case under New Jersey law, the Third Circuit
held that a consequential damages exclusion was enforceable, despite
failure of the essential purpose of a limited remedy, unless the exclusion
is unconscionable. 68 In Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.Master Engraving
Co.,69 a 1987 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that it was
adopting the reasoning of Chatlos.70 The standard actually set forth by
the New Jersey high court, however, seems by its terms to provide for at
62. Id. at 709.
63. RRX Indus., 772 F.2d at 547.
64. Dowty Commun., 817 F. Supp. at 585 (dictum) (stating that buyer could obtain
consequential damages despite exclusion and absence of unconscionability, if the "alleged
breach was 'total and fundamental'"); but see Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc.,
635 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1980); Harper Tax Services, Inc. v. Quick Tax, Ltd., 686 F.
Supp. 109, 112 (D. Md. 1988). Dowty has also been followed under District of Columbia
law. Potomac Plaza Terraces v. QSC Prods., 868 F. Supp. 346, 352-53 (D.D.C. 1994).
65. See RRX Indus., 772 F.2d at 547; Sunny Indus. v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7001, *38-*39 (7th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit is not alone in adopting a
case-by-case analysis. The Seventh Circuit, in a recent unpublished decision, summarized
a number of Illinois decisions on the subject and concluded that Illinois law also requires a
case-by-case approach. Id. See also Mid Continent Cabinetry, Inc. v. George Koch Sons,
Inc., No. 87-1248-C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10644, *40 (D. Kan. July 11, 1991) (predicting
that Indiana would follow such an approach.)
66. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 107 N.J. 584.
67. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 1087.
69. 107 N.J. 584.
70. Id. at 598.
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least some factual analysis on a question other than unconscionability. 7 1
The Kearney court held: "[I] t is only when the circumstances of the transaction, including the seller's breach, cause the consequential damage exclusion to be inconsistent with the intent and reasonable commercial
expectations of the parties that invalidation of the exclusionary clause
would be appropriate under the Code." 72 This standard seems to allow
the possibility under New Jersey law of overturning a consequential
damages exclusion based on the parties' "reasonable commercial
expectations."73
Another mixed approach appears to be similar to-and perhaps, in
part, is a model for-the UCITA approach. In Cooley v. Big Horn
Harvestore Systems, Inc.,7a the Colorado Supreme Court appeared to
place itself squarely in the interdependent camp, but with a key modification enabling a vendor to draft an enforceable exclusion. 7 5 The court
declared:
When a purchase agreement establishing that the only warranty provided is a warranty to repair or replace defective parts contains NO SEPARATE

PROVISION

UNAMBIGUOUSLY

RECORDING

THE

INTENT

OF

THE

PARTIES TO PROHIBIT A BUYER'S RECOVERY OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

the
buyer is entitled by virtue of section 4-2-719(2) to the statutory remedy
of consequential damages [in the event of failure of essential purpose]
notwithstanding a general contractual disclaimer to the contrary. The
purchase agreement here contains no such provision; thus the trial
court properly concluded that the76plaintiffs were not foreclosed from recovering consequential damages.
Although the Cooley court struck down the consequential damages
exclusion before it, the court's rationale gives sellers-and, in the present context, software vendors-a clear indication how to write a consequential damages exclusion that appears likely to survive failure of a
limited remedy's essential purpose. 77 The absent provision in the Cooley
purchase agreement was "a separate provision unambiguously recording
the intent of the parties to prohibit" consequential damages even when a
sole contractual remedy fails of its essential purpose. 78 By implication,
the presence of such a provision would have made the exclusion enforceaEVEN WHEN SUCH SOLE REMEDY FAILS OF ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE,

71. See Id.
72. Id. at 600.
73. A similar result appears possible in Connecticut, where a federal district court has
predicted that the Connecticut Supreme Court would follow Kearney. McKernan v. United
Technologies Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60, 71 (D. Conn. 1989).
74. 813 P.2d 736.
75. Id. at 748.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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ble. In other words, even though Cooley adopts the interdependent view
on its facts, it allows the parties to make Sections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3)
independent by clearly stating that they are doing so. 7 9 A vendor, under
this approach, can achieve the vendor's desired result with careful drafting (and the customer's acquiescence), but risks paying the price if it fails
to address the issue in the agreement's express terms.
There is, however, one key contrast between Cooley and the approach taken in UCITA, which further illustrates how UCITA can provide greater assurance that a consequential damages exclusion will be
enforced. In Cooley, the court stated: "[A] remedy fails of its essential
purpose if it operates to deprive a party of the substantial value of the
contract. . . . The [buyer] purchase had value only to the extent the
[product] functioned, as advertised ....
,,so On this basis, a failure to
repair was held to constitute a failure of essential purpose of a limited
warranty, even though the warranty provided that in the event of a defective product or part, the manufacturer, at its option, would "repair OR
ALLOW CREDIT for such part .... . 8 1
In contrast, the official comment to UCITA Section 803 states:
Courts must ask what was the purpose of the agreed remedy. A different purpose exists for remedies limited to replacement or repair, and
remedies that include a remedy consisting of a refund right. In the absence of a refund remedy, the purpose is to provide a functioning product. In cases where the remedy includes a right to a refund, the purpose
82
is to return money that was paid for the defective performance.
The comment to UCITA Section 803 concludes that only if the remedy requires replacement or repair, but not a refund, does the agreed
remedy contemplate a functioning product.8 3 The comment thus appears to suggest that, so long as a vendor offers a refund remedy and is
actually prepared to grant the refund, the limited remedy should not
under UCITA be deemed to fail of its essential purpose, even though the
remedy, as in Cooley, also includes, in the alternative, a repair remedy.
From the vendor's standpoint, the official comment to UCITA Section 803 suggests an additional technique for enhancing enforceability of
consequential damages exclusions. 8 4 This technique is simply to include
8 5
in the limited remedy a refund right along with any repair warranty.
If it does so, and arguably even if the refund is only partial, the vendor
can contend that the purpose of the limited remedy, taken as a whole, is
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 744-45.
Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
UCITA § 803, Off. Cmt.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not to provide a functioning product, but merely to allow the customer to
recover whatever refund is provided in the event the product does not
function. s 6 On this view, if the refund is provided, the limited remedy
does not fail of its essential purpose, and the possible effects of such failure need not even be considered.
A potential customer response to this argument, if the refund remedy is accompanied by a repair remedy, is that both UCC Section 2718(2) and UCITA Section 803(b) state that otherwise available remedies may be had if "an exclusive or limited remedy" fails of its essential
purpose.8 7 This language seems to indicate that the failed remedy need
not be "exclusive" so long as it is "limited."8 8 A contract, of course, can
contain only one exclusive remedy, but it can contain more than one limited remedy. A limited remedy of repair can fail of its essential purpose,
even though a separate limited remedy of refund is fulfilled. The customer could contend that under the language of both the UCC and
UCITA, such a failure is enough.8 9 Nevertheless, the official comment to
the UCITA Section 803 seems likely to encourage the view that an alternative refund remedy avoids application of the essential purpose doctrine based on a failure to repair. 90
Thus, in the second set of jurisdictions with case-by-case or mixed
standards, UCITA also appears to offer potential vendor advantages in
the application of the failure of essential purpose standard under an
agreement that is properly drafted from the vendor's point of view.
UCITA may also offer a greater degree of predictability in comparison
with standards that delve into particular circumstances to arrive at an
answer.
The "Independent"View
Under the law of a third set of jurisdictions, there is substantial authority that a consequential damages exclusion, unless unconscionable,
survives a limited remedy's failure of essential purpose. This group most
92
91
Georgia, 9 3
but also includes Alaska,
notably includes New York,
86. Id.
87. U.C.C. § 2-718(2) (emphasis added); UCITA § 803(b) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 803, Off. Cmt.
91. McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1198 (2d Cir.
1995) (citing extensive N.Y. authority).
92. Pierce v. CatalinaYachts, Inc., 2 P.3d 618, 622-23 (Alaska 2000).
93. Atlanta Specialty Food Distribs.v. Watkins Leasing, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15662,
*9 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 1982).
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Iowa, 94 Kentucky, 95 Massachusetts, 96 Minnesota, 97 New Hampshire, 98
South Carolina, 9 9 Tennessee, 10 0 Utah, 10 1 and in a pre-UCITA decision,
Virginia.1 0 2 In comparison with such authority, UCITA provides less of
a vendor advantage, if any. In fact, if a vendor did not update its form
agreements to reflect UCITA's drafting requirements as outlined above,
the vendor could be better off under existing law in these jurisdictions.
The independent approach of this third set of states was characterized by a Connecticut federal district court in 1989 as the view supported
by the "current trend.' u0 3 Whereas most of the pro-customer authority
originates before 1989, the pro-vendor states include four-Alaska, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Utah-in which state supreme courts have
10 4
resolved the issue since 1989 in favor of the independent approach.
The independent approach also seems to have gained more support in
cases involving sophisticated buyers, as contrasted with the consumer
buyers of products such as motor homes under some of the earlier, interdependent decisions.
Nevertheless, it would be premature to assume that the independent
approach necessarily will prevail, absent UCITA, under the laws of
states in which the highest court has not yet ruled. Pennsylvania law
provides a clear illustration. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like the
majority of state supreme courts, has not decided the independent/interdependent question. In recent years, several decisions of federal district
courts under Pennsylvania law have adopted the pro-vendor
05
approach.'
94. Middletown Concrete Prods.v. Black Clawson Co., 802 F. Supp. 1135, 1152 (D. Del.
1992); but see Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1981).
95. Providence & W.R. Co. v. Sargent & Greeleaf Inc., 802 F. Supp. 680, 691 (D.R.I.
1992).
96. Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Mass. 1990).
97. Intl. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 534 N.W.2d 261, 269 (Minn. 1995); contra Soo Line
R.R. Co. v. FruehaufCorp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977).
98. Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Elec. DataSys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 241 (D.N.H. 1993).
99. Riegel Power Corp. v. Voith Hyrdo, 888 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1989); Myrtle
Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1046 (D.S.C. 1993), affd
mem., 46 F.3d 1125 (4th Cir. 1995).
100. Aquascene, Inc. v. Noritsu Amer. Corp., 831 F. Supp. 602, 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
101. Schurtz v. BMW ofN. Amer., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Utah 1991).
102. Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Engr., 364 S.E.2d 215, 219-20 (Va. 1988).
103. McKernan, 717 F. Supp. at 70. But see Special Project, Article Two Warranties in
Commercial Transactions:An Update, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1159, 1307 (1987) (concluding
that a majority of decisions had adopted the interdependent approach).
104. See supra nn. 73, 77, 78, 82.
105. See e.g. NortheasternPower Co. v. Belcke-Durr, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13437,
*54-55 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1999); Otobai, Inc. v. Auto Tell Servs., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7592, *33 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 1994).
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Recently, however, in a software dispute, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rendered a decision that bucks the
"current trend."10 6 In Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21,
Inc.,107 the plaintiff's claim arose from a software license agreement.10 8
The software allegedly failed to function as warranted, and the defendant allegedly "failed to fix problems with the software despite numerous
requests," requiring the plaintiff to obtain software from another
09
company.1
In refusing to dismiss the complaint based on a clause excluding consequential damages, the court observed that the parties had "stumbled
into a legal quagmire that has divided courts across the nation."1 10 The
court acknowledged decisions adopting the independent view, but disagreed with their "logic and . . .conclusions" and predicted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not follow them."'
Whether or not the Caudill Seed holding eventually prevails as the
law of Pennsylvania, the decision demonstrates that software vendors
cannot take for granted the outcome of disputes on this issue under state
law that has not been clearly settled by a state supreme court, even
when pro-vendor lower court authority exists. Thus, UCITA may offer
the vendor an advantage in such states.
UCITA and the "Bargainin Fact"
The Caudill Seed court reached a different decision from its Pennsylvania federal court counterparts in large part because it focused less
on the specific language of either the agreement or the UCC than on the
court's conception of the basic bargain.
In exchange for parting with an arsenal of legal remedies, the buyer
receives from the seller one silver bullet: the seller's assurance that in
the event the product does not work, she will do whatever is necessary to
repair or replace the product until it works. But what happens when
that silver bullet turns to dust, when the seller refuses to abide by its
promise to repair or replace? The courts adhering to the Chatlos line of
reasoning would leave the buyer defenseless, essentially holding that a
limitation on liability clause constitutes unilateral disarmament on the
part of the buyer. I believe that outcome to be unreasonable. Such a
reading leaves the buyer completely at the mercy of the seller, because
the buyer's only remedy is the seller's assurances that it will repair or
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
ill.

See infra n. 107 and text accompanying.
123 F. Supp. 2d 826 (E.D. Pa. 2000), modified, 126 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 831, 833.
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replace.112
Caudill Seed suggests that as long as courts try to ascertain the true
basis of the bargain, at least some courts may be reluctant to give full
effect under the UCC to consequential damages exclusions they perceive
as upsetting the fundamental bargain. 113 The UCC is based on "legal
realism," which attempts to supplant legal formalisms with what the law
takes to be commercial reality. 1 14 Under the UCC, the "agreement" is
not necessarily the document labeled "agreement," but rather is "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances."' 15 The Caudill Seed court's analysis relies
on a view of the overall bargain and the essential role in that bargain of a
1 16
vendor's promise to repair.
UCITA also defines the agreement as the parties' "bargain in
fact." 117 It has been suggested that "UCITA eschews the formalism of
classical contract theory in favor of the legal realism of [UCCI Article
2."118 Because UCITA specifies how a limited remedy's failure of essential purpose affects a consequential damages exclusion, courts may be
less likely under UCITA to decide-as in Caudill Seed-the effect of a
failure of essential purpose based on a judicial view of the actual overall
bargain. UCITA seems to presuppose that an express statement in the
agreement making the consequential damages exclusion independent of
the agreed remedy will, at least in most instances, authoritatively define
the parties' bargain in fact in a way that allows what the Caudill Seed
court called "unilateral disarmament on the part of the buyer." 11 9 If so,
UCITA may represent, for better or worse, a step away from the practice
of allowing courts to transcend the agreement's words in the quest to
derive the bargain's "essence."
Willfulness and Bad Faith
A remaining question is whether UCITA's relatively favorable terms
for vendors on the failure of essential purpose issue necessarily mean
that consequential damages exclusions, if not unconscionable, will be upheld automatically. This question requires a review of several decisions
112. Id. at 832-33 (footnote omitted).
113. Id.
114. See Phillips, supra n. 11, at 159.
115. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
116. See Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
117. UCITA § 102(a)(4).
118. Rustad, supra n. 20, at 563. See also Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA: A Commercial
Contract Code, 17 Computer Lawyer 3 (2000) ("UCITA follows a principle set out by Llewellyn and Gilmore: Commercial contract law for the major parts of our economy should be
tailored and relevant to the type of transactions to which it relates.").
119. Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
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that fall squarely within the independent camp, but that still provide a
possible further basis for overcoming the exclusion.
For example, in a 1990 decision, 120 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a consequential damages exclusion despite a claim of
failure of essential purpose, but the court noted that its answer might be
different if the facts showed "wilful dilatoriness or repudiation of warranty obligations by the seller."12 1 The possibility that the exclusion
might be defeated in such circumstances presents an additional contractual vulnerability of such clauses, and this vulnerability may persist
under UCITA. The Alaska Supreme Court, in a 2000 decision adopting
the independent approach, nevertheless declined to enforce a consequential damages exclusion in a consumer case because "[t]he jury specifically found that [the vendor] acted in bad faith in failing to honor its
1 22
warranty."
Even under New York law, which has consistently taken the provendor approach to failure of essential purpose, the Second Circuit in
1995 remarked in dictum, "[t]here is some support for [the plaintiffs]
contention that bad faith is an exception to the enforceability of a consequential damages exclusion under section 2-719(3)."123 And, a 1996 district court case applying New York law, the court stated that, "even if the
plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the limited remedy of repair has
failed of its essential purpose, an exclusion of consequential damages
that is not unconscionable will be given effect 'where the failure of the
repair and replacement warranty is not due to bad faith or willfully dila124
tory conduct' ..These federal decisions did not mention the 1994 New York Court of
Appeals decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes International, Inc.,12 5 a software case, which held that deliberate or intentional
nonperformance was not "willful" under a contractual provision permit1 26
ting recovery of consequential damages for, inter alia, "'Willful acts."
Although this holding related to particular contractual language, the decision at least suggests that even if "bad faith" or "willfully dilatory conduct" can defeat a consequential damages limitation under New York
law, the conduct may need to represent more than merely a deliberate
decision not to comply with the contract. Indeed, if New York law re120. Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182 (Mass. 1990).
121. Id. at 185-86.
122. Pierce v. CatalinaYachts, Inc., 2 P.3d 618, 624 (Alaska 2000).
123. McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. St. Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1198 n.9 (2d Cir.
1995).
124. Roneker v. Kenworth Truck Co., 944 F. Supp. 179, 184 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting
Cayuga Harverster,Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (App. Div. 1983)).
125. 643 N.E.2d 504 (N.Y. 1994).
126. Id. at 507.
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quires malice or similar intent to establish an exception to enforceability
under UCC Section 2-719(3),127 then New York law may be superior,
from the vendor's standpoint to UCITA as enacted in Maryland.
This is so because a pre-UCITA decision by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland appears to recognize two exceptions to enforceability under Maryland law under circumstances well short of malice. 1 28 In that decision, Dowty Communications, Inc. v. Novatel
Computer Systems Corp.,129 the court stated that, under the UCC, the
requirements of Sections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3) present "two levels of restrictions" that "must be analyzed separately." 130 Nevertheless, the
court went on to say that if the buyer succeeded in showing a failure of
essential purpose under UCC Section 2-719(2), the buyer's opportunity
to collect consequential damages would depend on showing that the consequential damages exclusion was "'unconscionable,' OR that [the
seller's] alleged reach was 'total and fundamental,' OR that [the seller]
13 1
acted in 'bad faith."'
One could argue that UCITA eliminates both the "total and fundamental" alternative and the "bad faith" alternative identified in Dowty as
grounds under Maryland law to overcome the consequential damages exclusion. As noted above, UCITA states in Section 803(c) that "[flailure or
unconscionability of an agreed exclusive or limited remedy makes a term
disclaiming or limiting consequential or incidental damages unenforceable unless the agreement expressly makes the disclaimer or limitation
independent of the agreed remedy."13 2 The argument would be that if
the agreement expressly makes the disclaimer independent of the agreed
remedy, then failure of essential purpose never makes the consequential
damages exclusion unenforceable, regardless of whether the breach that
gives rise to such failure is total or in bad faith.
In other words, "total and fundamental" breach and "bad faith" describe the manner in which or the reasons why the remedy failed of its
essential purpose and therefore arguably become irrelevant if the failure
itself becomes irrelevant. But since the relevant UCC provisions do not
mention "total and fundamental" breach or "bad faith" in the first place,
it is unclear whether their significance is necessarily contingent on the
failure of essential purpose, or whether, instead, they are sufficient in
127. See id.
128. Dowty Commun., Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 581 (D. Md.
1992), affd sub nom. Cray Commun., Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 396
(4th Cir. 1994).
129. Dowty Commun., 817 F. Supp. 581 (D. Md. 1992), afrd sub nom. Cray Commun.,
Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 1994)
130. Dowty Commun., 817 F. Supp. at 585.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. UCITA § 803(c).
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and of themselves. This is especially so in the case of bad faith, which, as
discussed above, courts have suggested provides a basis independent of
these UCC provisions for disregarding a consequential damages
exclusion.
CONCLUSION
It appears that UCITA offers advantages to vendors and corresponding disadvantages to customers vis-A-vis case law that does not clearly
resolve the failure of essential purpose issue in favor of the independent
view. In so doing, UCITA also appears to reduce the ability of courts to
look beyond UCITA-compliant consequential damages exclusions to discern the parties' "true" bargain as it relates to such damages. 133 UCITA
is a complex statute, however, and as discussed just above, even the application of UCITA, at least under Maryland law as it currently stands,
may not necessarily protect the vendor in disputes where "total and fundamental" breach or "bad faith" can be shown.' 3 4 For these reasons,
practicing lawyers still need to weigh UCITA's pluses and minuses from
the point of view of particular transactions and likely issues in those
transactions, and those who consider the merits of legislation to enact a
version of UCITA will want to consider not only UCITA's specific provisions, but also how far they reach and how much of existing law they are
meant to displace.
133. Id.§ 803.
134. See Dowty Commun., 817 F. Supp. at 585.

